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Abstract
Larry May makes some important arguments about Hobbes on law and particularly 
about the significance of the notion of equity for Hobbes, both as a moral law and as a 
(possibly limiting) requirement of a sovereign’s lawmaking authority. I am generally 
supportive of May’s project while remaining sceptical about the conclusion that a self-
restraining sovereign is a genuinely limited sovereign.
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 Introduction
This is an interesting and important book on Hobbes’s writing on the law 
which I enjoyed reading and learned a great deal from. I should also say that I 
am sympathetic to Larry May’s view that, despite Hobbes’s many arguments 
and remarks that seem to favour or support absolutism, there is some impor-
tant sense in which he is a less than convincing absolutist. As May says; 
‘Hobbes’s views are both more complex and more palatable’ (p. 18) than they 
are often seen to be.
I will restrict my comments to the arguments concerning: sovereignty and 
the limitation of sovereignty, Hobbes’s legal theory, the relationship between 
law and morality for Hobbes and some of the arguments about equity.
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May starts by stating that the thesis of the book is that ‘Hobbes is much more 
amenable to moral, and even legal limits on law-making – indeed closer to Lon 
Fuller than to today’s legal positivists – than he is often portrayed.’ (p. 1) He 
adds, that to support this thesis he will argue, that Hobbes places greater weight 
on equity than on justice, and that understanding the role of equity is the key 
to his legal philosophy.’ Further, he will argue that ‘[e]quity … is the moral con-
cept that provides restrictions on what a sovereign can legitimately do,’ (ibid.).
 Sovereignty – Limitations of
May starts by granting a lot to the other side of the argument. ‘Hobbes is rela-
tively clear in saying that there are no substantive limits on sovereignty and 
that there should not be any, since the sovereign needs to be as strong as pos-
sible in order to secure the peace’ (p. 3) May interprets ‘substantive’ limits to 
mean limits by subjects or citizens who could restrict what the sovereign does. 
But he says there are other sorts of limitation that would not weaken the sov-
ereign in this way.
May says ‘Hobbes followed Bodin in thinking that sovereignty was not prop-
erly so called when it was divided.’ And he continues, ‘I will argue that Hobbes 
clearly disfavoured divided sovereignty (at least in Leviathan) but … Hobbes 
did agree that sovereignty could and should be limited.’ (p. 23)
How then, is sovereignty limited, according to May? He sets out five types of 
limitation on sovereign law-making power: moral limitations, prudential limi-
tations (many would argue, of course, that these are the same for Hobbes), legal 
and structural limitations, international limitations and self-limitations. The 
important ones, for the arguments I want to discuss, are the moral limitations.
 Moral Limitations
Morality, for Hobbes, is set out in the laws of nature, as he says ‘the Science of 
these Lawes, is the true Morall Philosophy’ (Lev., Ch 15, Squib, p. 215.) And May 
argues that the main evidence for saying that morality limits legality ‘comes 
from the fact that all of the laws of nature, … are said still to be binding after the 
institution of sovereignty.’ (p. 4) The textual evidence for this includes Hobbes’s 
infamously puzzling declaration, that ‘the Law of Nature and the Civill Law, 
contain each other, and are of equall extent.’ And then, the statement that 
while in the state of nature they ‘are not properly Lawes, but qualities that 
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dispose men to peace, and to obedience.’ But, ‘[w]hen a Common-wealth is 
once settled, then are they actually Lawes, and not before; as being then the 
commands of the Commonwealth.’ (Lev., Ch 26, p. 314). This does seem clear, 
that Hobbes argues that the sovereign must give the laws of nature the status 
of laws proper once he has the sovereign power. And this also links with what 
Hobbes has said in Chapter 15, that ‘the Lawes of Nature oblige in Conscience 
alwayes but in Effect then onely when there is Security’ (Lev., Ch. 15, squib, 
p. 215). May’s next point is that ‘some of these laws of nature, especially equity, 
bind the sovereign’. (p. 4)
Again, there is good textual evidence for this. But the more difficult question 
is in what sense are the laws of nature binding for the sovereign? For Hobbes 
also says, just after the passage quoted above from Chapter 26, ‘to make them 
binding, there is need of the Ordinances of Soveraign Power,’ (Lev., Ch. 26, 
p. 314) In what sense then, can they bind the sovereign himself?
May argues that, first, ‘when something binds in conscience it is truly bind-
ing’ (p. 5) and second, that the laws of nature (particularly equity) form the 
basis for the duties of the sovereign as set out in Chapter 30. (ibid.) It is there 
that Hobbes links the duty to be equitable to the fundamental duty of the sov-
ereign to provide for the safety of the people. ‘The safety of the people, 
requireth further from him, or them that have the sovereign power, that justice 
be equally administered to all degrees of people; … for in this consisteth equity, 
to which, as being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as much sub-
ject, as any of the meanest of his people. (Lev Ch. 30, quoted in May, p. 6)
May then argues that ‘for Hobbes, even the bindingness of equity is grounded 
in prudence. The sovereign should not violate the principle of equity, because 
to do so would risk the kind of open warfare that would jeopardize sovereignty 
by undermining the sovereign’s ability to ensure the safety of the people.’ 
(p. 41) This, says May, provides a moral limit on law-making in the sense that 
when (and only when) the immoral actions of the law-maker jeopardize that 
which grounds sovereignty, then there enters a limiting constraint on the law. 
(p. 41) We might call this a pragmatic argument for restraint. But it raises an old 
problem in Hobbes scholarship, which is, how should we understand his moral 
theory? If we see it as purely prudential can it be said to be truly referring to 
morality at all? If not, then we do not have an argument about moral limits on 
sovereign law-making but rather just prudential limits. This, in my view, is one 
of the shortcomings of this part of the argument. It is very reliant on argu-
ments about Hobbes’s moral theory and as such runs the risk of becoming 
mired in the controversies that surround that theory.
May argues that ‘the moral limits on sovereign law-making are largely 
drawn in procedural terms by Hobbes: ruling out laws that are superfluous, 
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contradictory, or secret, as well as laws that cause citizenry to lose faith in the 
fairness of the law.’ ‘[A]ny laws that have the effect of undermining peace are 
ones that the sovereign is prohibited from promulgating by the principles of 
equity …’ (p. 41) May has made a strong case for the claim that Hobbes does 
think that there are at least some moral limitations on sovereign law-making, 
despite my more general misgivings about the disadvantages of relying on 
arguments about his moral theory.
 Equity
May argues, rather ingeniously, that what Hobbes loses with his impoverished 
notion of justice as pure legality, devoid of any normative content, he regains 
with his broadened and rich version of equity, which goes beyond a mere pro-
cedural rule of equal treatment to encompass fairness itself. And so the norma-
tive content that was lost to justice is recovered and found instead in the notion 
of equity. And further, May argues, ‘equity not justice, is the dominant moral 
category in Hobbes’s political and legal philosophy.’ (ibid.)
Given that the Hobbesian sovereign does not have any legal duties as such, 
being outside the social contract, May concludes that ‘his duties must, in some 
sense or other, be “natural” duties. (p. 68) And he draws on a remark in De Cive 
to set up the argument. ‘Now all the duties of the sovereign are contained in 
this one sentence, the safety of the people is the supreme law’ (De Cive, Ch. XIII, 
quoted in May, p. 68). As safety is defined very broadly for Hobbes, including 
everything necessary for a commodious life, May connects the duty to the sov-
ereign’s acceptance of the power and authority granted him by the people, and 
this includes accepting that he must guarantee the peace. May has already 
argued that this amounts to what he terms a constitutional limitation on the 
sovereign; once he fails to keep the peace, the contract is dissolved and he 
loses the right to rule. Equity, which May argues is the prime law of nature, 
adds a moral limitation on the exercise of rulership. Drawing on what Hobbes 
says in A Dialogue …, about the Equity courts, he also argues that this moral 
limitation is one of substance rather than purely procedural. Equity provides 
the standard by which law can be judged to be good or bad by judges and by 
the king ‘and concerns whether they have correctly interpreted or applied the 
law.’ (p. 80) In Leviathan Hobbes says ‘The things that make a good judge, or 
good interpreter of the laws, are first a right understanding of that principle 
law of nature called equity,’ (p. 82). In the Dialogue, May says that Hobbes 
explicitly states that laws cannot be unreasonable and implies that laws can-
not be capricious or superfluous and that all this follows from the principle of 
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equity. This extension of the scope of equity, argues May, creates limitations on 
what the law-maker can declare to be law that ‘verge into being substantive 
limitations’ (p. 83).
He has shown that for Hobbes, moral limitations, provided by the law of 
nature that is equity, restrict what laws the sovereign can make. This limita-
tion, he claims, binds the law-maker in a moral way, at least in his conscience. 
And with this last phrase, the carefully constructed arguments of the chapter 
are in danger of unravelling, in my view. At the moment a sovereign is told that 
such limitations bind him in conscience only, I can see the malevolent grin of 
the dictator return.
 Legal Theory – Hobbes not a strict positivist
May made the argument that Hobbes is not a strict legal positivist when he 
claimed that there are some moral strictures on law-making. When Hobbes 
grants that ‘it is true that they that have the sovereign power may commit iniq-
uity; but not injustice’ (Lev., quoted in May, p. 4) he seems to be opening the 
door to an interpretation of his legal theory as holding some moral procedural 
limits on law-making or law-enforcing. May argues, that although he is not a 
strict legal positivist, Hobbes is also not a natural law theorist (as some recent 
as well as not so recent commentators have suggested), because he does not 
endorse the notion of substantive law being subject to a moral test. As May 
puts it, ‘the content of the positive law must remain unchallenged in order 
for the sovereign law-maker to provide the peace and security for which we 
search.’ (p. 121) What Hobbes does allow, according to May, is that ‘the proce-
dures by which this content is interpreted and applied is open to critique in 
terms of the natural law principle of equity. Equity constrains the law-maker.’ 
(ibid.) May likens Hobbes’s view to that of Lon Fuller and his theory of law as 
‘procedural as distinguished from a substantive natural law.’ (ibid.) He con-
cludes ‘Hobbes’s views about the limits of law-makers are nearly all procedural, 
even as they are also connected to his unique view of secular laws of nature. 
(p. 242) It seems to me that May makes a strong case for Hobbes’s treatment of 
equity as a check on good law-making, which can be compared to Fuller’s pro-
cedural account.
The other argument I would like to mention briefly is that concerning the 
rule of law. May argues that Hobbes could be said to embrace, while never fully 
articulating ‘a minimalist notion of the rule of law’ (p. 155). This claim is heavily 
reliant on what Hobbes says in A Dialogue … where he sets out four criteria of 
a valid law as:
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1. The command of him or them who have the sovereign power
2. Given to those that be his or their subjects
3. Declaring publicly and plainly
4. What every of them may do, and what they must forbear to do (p. 38/39)
May argues that while the first two are typical expressions of the orthodox 
view of Hobbesian sovereignty, the second two could be said to provide some-
thing much more like a rudimentary notion of the rule of law. He says ‘These 
two requirements taken together form the foundation of various moral and 
structural limitations on the sovereign: laws will not be valid if they cannot be 
found and then understood by the people; laws will not be valid if they do not 
clearly specify what actions lie under the domain of those laws; and laws will 
not be valid if they are claimed to be retroactively binding.’ (p. 39)
These two arguments, first, that Hobbes seems to say that at least one moral 
principle (equity) should be applied as a (procedural) test for good law and the 
sovereign is obliged to make good law, and second, that Hobbes in his later life 
seems to endorse some rudimentary notion of the rule of law are, it seems to 
me, well made, persuasive and interesting.
The third argument concerning law, is that Hobbes, again relying on A 
Dialogue … shows some qualified support for the notion of mixed sovereignty 
or mixed monarchy. This is partly taken from Hobbes referring to the king-in-
parliament and commenting about the courts of equity in seventeenth cen-
tury, England. May claims that ‘Hobbes sees these courts as the place where 
unfairness or arbitrariness, as a matter of iniquity, can be countered, even 
though not as a matter of injustice. (p. 242) This claim would only have real 
significance, in my view, if Hobbes could be shown to have also come to sup-
port the idea of an independent judiciary, without which, in courts controlled 
by the king, it seems that when it comes to the crunch, any possible iniquity by 
the sovereign will be not be subject to any kind of check let alone punishment. 
And to be fair, May does himself say that Hobbes should have been more recep-
tive to the idea of an independent judiciary.
 Concluding Thoughts
May provides an enlightening and persuasive reading of Hobbes’s legal theory 
as one that is not strictly positivist, nor conventionally natural law but with 
procedural (moral) limitations on what laws may be made legitimately by the 
sovereign. Whether this amounts to any genuine limitation on what the sover-
eign may do, though, is still open to question, in my view. I wonder whether, in 
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the end, the argument for limited sovereignty can fully succeed, on the grounds 
that a self-limiting sovereign is not a truly, substantively, limited sovereign. If 
there is no person or persons and also no institution, that can question or chal-
lenge the sovereign, then the sovereign surely remains the only power and 
therefore, absolute.
Despite these doubts, I think that Larry May’s belief that Hobbes is in some 
sense not himself a fully committed or a fully consistent absolutist, is right. 
And I think the book does a great deal of very important work in exploring 
some of the non-absolutist strains in Hobbes’s thought.
